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VIABILITY OF CONSUMER GRADE






We propose utilizing budget consumer hardware and software to teach computer forensics
principles and for non-case work, research and developing new techniques. Consumer grade
hardware and free/open source software is more easily accessible in most developing markets
and can be used as a first purchase for education, technique development and even when
developing new techniques. These techniques should allow for small forensics laboratories or
classroom settings to have the tooling and framework for trying existing forensics techniques
or creating new forensics techniques on consumer grade hardware. We’ll be testing how viable
each individual piece of hardware is as well as combinations along with seeing at which point
utilizing forensics-grade hardware becomes necessary in order to proceed.
Keywords: component, formatting, style, styling, insert
1. INTRODUCTION
Developing countries worldwide still have a
disparity in education opportunities with the
"percentage of adults with a primary educa-
tion is 42 percent in low developing countries,
compared with 94 percent in very high devel-
oping countries" Press (2019). As these coun-
tries "bring household internet (15%), access
to computers (9.7%) and broadband knowl-
edge (0.7%)" Press (2019) to their citizens,
there will be more and more high technol-
ogy job opportunities. As computers become
more prevalent, cybercrime will eventually
become a concern and having a trained pop-
ulation that can take on the work that is
ahead will become more and more critical
since cybercrime does not tend to respect
geographical borders.
Growing local talent for computer forensics
and cybersecurity work is a long term endeav-
our that requires access to a lot of technology
and knowledge. The internet can provide
the knowledge but the question is, who will
provide the technology? Computer forensics
knowledge and principles require more hard-
ware even for a beginner digital forensics lab
Lawrence et al. (2018) than most of other dis-
ciplines and as explored, the cost of getting
access to this technology is far larger than
expected.
There is a serious need for budget-friendly
forensics hardware that can be used in class-
room settings and even research settings if
we want developing countries to take part
in forensics research and become a part of
the greater worldwide forensics body. This
hardware must be price competitive, must
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have educational value and should provide
the maximum amount of forensics value with
reproducible results.
As can be seen in Figure 1 even the used
hardware that was used for this project for
SATA imaging costs in excess of $110 (with-
out any of the cables to attach SATA media
to it). Adding in a SATA / IDE bridge in
Figure 2 like the one used for IDE imaging
(without cables for IDE media) adds an ex-
tra $90. Although $200 is not a prohibitive
amount to a large university in the United
States or a large police department, ensuring
the hardware is accessible to a wider audience
is in the industry’s best interest.
As can be seen in Table 1, that $200 price
point can sting when looking at what the
monthly adult wages in USD for some of the
Latin American countries currently entering a
developed or developing status FinancialRed
(2018) compared to adult US wages Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2019).
Table 1 shows how many working days an
average adult could be expected to spend in
order to save enough money to purchase the




The selection of consumer-grade hardware
and software were derived from online
searches on budget hardware and software
for outfitting a beginner forensics lab. A mix-
ture of this hardware and software should be
able to: create a forensics image from IDE or
SATA hard drive; clone disk from an IDE or
SATA hard drive; and write an image from
an image file to a disk. These tasks can illus-
trate the importance of minimizing spoilage
of evidence and hashing in an educational
environment.
The hardware outlined in Table 4 and Ta-
ble 5 was used to validate the forensic value
provided by the hardware in Table 2 and
Table 3. Items in Table 4 and Table 5 were
either purchased, existing hardware or loaned
in order to be tested.
Cinolink’s Dual Bay has a hardware based
cloning function that does not require a con-
nection to a computer and minimizes the
odds of accidentally contaminating the under-
lying evidence and can double as a forensic
wiper when paired with some open source
software listed in the Software Platform sec-
tion. Large disks up to 10TB are natively
supported and the hardware is USB 3.0 ca-
pable.
CoolGear’s ’Write Protect’ hardware in-
cludes all of the hardware to be able to mount
one 2.5" / 3.5" SATA and IDE device (at the
same time) and dedicated switches for write
protect for both SATA and IDE allowing for
use as both a read-only or read-write device.
There are additional safeties that make it
impossible to disable write blocking without
powering off and powering the device back
on but the manufacturer only supports write
blocking under Windows-based systems. For
2.5" devices, it is also possible to power the
device directly from the USB 3.0 connection
without carrying external power; this can be
useful in a classroom setting where power
may not be able to all desks.
2.2 Software Platform
In order to make testing feasible at this scale,
flash drives were used to hold the test suites
that would validate the hardware. In or-
der to make this possible, YUMI Multiboot
Pendrivelinux.com (2020) was used to load
multiple versions of different Linux and Win-
dows operating systems unto three separate
flash drives (Windows to Go, MBR-based
and UEFI-based). Only software that was
used during testing is listed under Table 6, 7
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Table 1. Time to Purchase Hardware
Country Monthly Wages USD Time To Purchase*
United States $3,744 2 days
Argentina $340 18 days
Brazil $295 21 days
Bolivia $300 20 days
Chile $413 15 days
Colombia $262 24 days
Costa Rica $512 12 days
Cuba $29 213 days
Dominican Republic $288 21 days
Ecuador $386 16 days
El Salvador $300 20 days
Guatemala $380 16 days
Honduras $341 18 days
Mexico $141 43 days
Nicaragua $115 53 days
Panama $731 8 days
Paraguay $368 16 days
Peru $283 21 days
Urugay $431 14 days
Venezuela $37 167 days
*Lower Values are Better for this Metric
Table 2. Consumer Grade Software
Name Purpose Price
Roadkil’s Diskwipe Forensic wipe Free
Roadkil’s Diskimage Imaging/Clone Free
Table 3. Consumer Grade Hardware
Name Purpose Price
Cinolink Dual Bay Clone/R/W for SATA $29.99
CoolGear SATA/IDE Write Protect SATA/IDE $49.99
ULTRA SATA/IDE IDE Writing $20.00*
*Not used for testing, just for setup
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Figure 1. Cost of Tableau T3U
Figure 2. Cost of Tableau T35e
and 8. All tools are listed in the order they
were used.
2.3 Testing Criteria
Due to the severe cost disparity of the hard-
ware ($70 for consumer grade, $200 for foren-
sics grade) and different speeds of the hard-
ware under test (USB 3.0 for consumer grade,
USB 2.0 for forensics grade), read / write
performance will not be tested. The main
criteria tested is the ability to take foren-
sics images of media (or duplicating media)
with a focus on ensuring checksums match
between consumer and forensics gear. This
criteria targets how reproducible the results
are.
2.4 Testing Plan
Before any work was performed, all of the me-
dia used was forensically wiped using Road-
kil’s Diskwipe to write a basic single pass of
zeros on each drive. The NIST’s CFTT Fed-
erated Testing Thelma.allen@nist.gov (2020)
suite was used after testing completed to val-
idate the forensic wiping capabilityof Home-
land Security (DHS) Science & (ST) (2020c).
The Evidence Storage drive was formatted
to NTFS for storage of any media while
live booting Linux. The Suspect drive and
Clone drives were left in their forensically
wiped state. The CoolGear device in ques-
tion was tested using the Hardware Write
Block test under the NIST’s CFTT Federated
Testing Thelma.allen@nist.gov (2020) suite
and CRU’s Writeblocker Validation Utility
in Windows before performing any tests. Re-
ports on this testing were given to NIST for
publication.
In order to ensure a realistic test scenario,
a Windows 10 environment was prepared
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Table 4. Storage Media
Name Purpose Price
Sandisk CZ48 128Gb Flash Linux MBR Live Suites $18.99
Spare 16Gb Flash Linux EUFI Live Suites Pre-owned
Samsung Fit 64Gb Flash Windows To Go $13.00
Seagate 1TB Expansion Evidence Storage Pre-owned
Inland 120Gb SSD Suspect Drive (SATA) Pre-owned
Seagate Momentus 320Gb HDD Clone Drive (SATA) Pre-owned
Maxtor DiamondMax 10 160GB Clone Drive (IDE) $14.95
Table 5. Forensics Grade Hardware
Name Purpose Price
Tableau T3U SATA Write Blocker Loaned
Digital Intel. UB IDE Write Blocker Loaned
Table 6. Linux MBR Flash Drive
OS Tool Purpose Price*
NIST CFTT v4 / v5 Validation Validation Open Source
Caine 11 Guymager Imaging Open Source
Kali Linux 2020 (forensic) Guymager Imaging Open Source
Kali Linux 2020 (live) Guymager Imaging Open Source
Parrot 4.7 (forensic) Guymager Imaging Open Source
Parrot 4.7 (live) Guymager Imaging Open Source
OSFClone 1.2.1000 Clone Imaging Open Source
© 2021 JDFSL Page 5
JDFSL 2021 Viability of Consumer Grade Hardware
Table 7. Linux UEFI Flash Drive
OS Tool Purpose Price*
Deft 8.2 Guymager Imaging Open Source
Paladin 7 (read only) Imager Imaging Donationware*
Paladin Edge 64 (read only) Imager Imaging Donationware*
Paladin 7 (read / write) Imager Imaging Donationware*
Paladin Edge 64 (read / write) Imager Imaging Donationware*
*Recommended donation: $25
Table 8. Windows To Go Flash Drive
Tool Install Type Purpose Price*
CRU WriteBlocking Installer Validation Free*
Lightscreen Portable Portable Screenshots Open Source
MouseJiggle Portable Portable Jiggler Open Source
Notepad++ Portable Portable Note taking Open Source
Belkasoft RAM Capturer Portable RAM Capture Free*
MAGNET RAM Capture Portable RAM Capture Free*
ofview Portable Open files Free
MAGNET EDD Portable Encryption Free*
wirelesskeyview Portable Credentials Free
vaultpasswordview Portable Credentials Free
dataprotectiondecryptor Portable Credentialss Free
credentialsfileview Portable Credentials Free
FTK Imager Lite Portable Imaging Free
Belkasoft Acq. Tool Portable Imaging Free
Roadkil Disk Image Portable Imaging Free
MAGNET Acquire Installer Imaging Free*
Tableau Imager Installer Imaging Free*
FTK Imager 4.2.1 Installer Imaging Free*
*Must Provide Email to Download
with some common relevant forensics arti-
facts (browser history, credentials) on the
Suspect drive.
In this hypothetical Case B451C, a search
warrant has been served to a person and their
hard drive was seized. Forensics specialists on
the scene have started a case file containing
some of the pictures and procedures that were
taken on site.
Case Notes include some of the steps taken
in this case (including but not limited to):
taking pictures of any screens when arriving
at the suspect’s computer, taking pictures of
any media attached to the target computer
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Viability of Consumer Grade Hardware JDFSL 2021
by the forensic specialist, output of any tools
executed on the suspect’s computer and end-
ing with pulling the power cable out of the
suspect’s machine and retrieving the internal
drives.
The existence of information on the sus-
pect’s computer screen lead the forensics spe-
cialists to suspect there was an email account
being used; some live tools were run on the
suspect’s system and data was stored on an
attached Evidence drive. Pictures of the
setup were taken at the scene and are at-
tached in Appendix A.
Process Explorer was used to take a dump
of the currently active Microsoft Edge web
browser. OpenedFileView was used to look at
any files that were being used at the time and
a dump was captured.Three RAM captures
were taken at the scene using Belkasoft’s
RAM Capturer, MAGNET Ram Capture
and DumpIt with the results in Appendix
A.
Since there was evidence suggesting the
suspect had an email account, forensics spe-
cialists ran a series of credentials finding soft-
ware (CredentialsFileView, VaultPassword-
View, WirelessKeyView, DataProtectionDe-
cryptor) to extract any credentials that could
be useful during the investigation.
After all data was stored in the case file,
both the evidence drive and the tools flash
drive were ejected safely and the power was
pulled. A picture of the suspect’s drive inside
of the machine was taken before bagging and
tagging the evidence.
2.5 Itemized Test Plan
• Image initial drive using FTK Image,
Belkasoft Captureand Roadkil Disk Im-
age.
• Create a clone using the Cinolink Drive
Dock (SATA to SATA).
• Create a clone using Roadkil Disk Image
(Image to IDE).
• Validate the cloning results using NIST’s
CFTT Federated Testing.
• Take forensic images using Windows 10
with professional hardware.
• Take forensic images using Windows 10
with consumer hardware.
• Take forensic images using Windows To
Go with professional hardware.
• Take forensic images using Windows To
Go with consumer hardware.
• Take forensic images using various Linux
distributions with professional hardware.
• Take forensic images using various Linux
distributions with consumer hardware.
Most of the testing taking place was around
imaging so we began by taking a basic
forensic image using the professional grade
Tableau T3U SATA bridge of the Suspect
Drive. After taking the images using our
three target tools (FTK Imager Lite, Belka-
soft Capture and Roadkil Disk Image), we
made sure the hashes for all three are consis-
tent. After these images are taken, the Cino-
Link duplicator was used to make a clone
from the Suspect Drive to the Clone Drive
(SATA). After cloning is complete, images
of the Suspect Drive were retaken using the
Tableau T3U SATA bridge with the same
three tools (FTK Imager Lite, Belkasoft Cap-
ture and Roadkil Disk Image) and additional
images were taken of the Clone Drive (SATA)
using the same methodology. Roadkil Disk
Image has additional functionality to write
an image back to a disk so we used this
tool with the CoolGear (set to non-write pro-
tect mode) to make a forensics clone using
the original Suspect Drive unto the Clone
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Drive (IDE). After cloning is complete, im-
ages of the Clone Drive (IDE) were taken
using the same methodology as the Clone
Drive (SATA). After all images have been
taken, the NIST’s CFTT Federated Test-
ingThelma.allen@nist.gov (2020) was used to
validate the cloning capabilities of the tools
used (CinoLink Duplicator and Roadkil Disk
Image).
This testing completed the setup phase for
all followup tests and the hashes extracted
from these were considered the canonical
truth for all followup tests; any deviation
from the results acquired at this stage was
be considered to be a test failure against the
consumer grade hardware or software. Road-
kil Disk Image was be used in a test failure
to attempt to reset the media back to the
original state before continuing on.
After setup has been completed, the fol-
lowing tests were be performed for each sce-
nario outlined: forensic image of Suspect
Drive using CoolGear hardware, forensic im-
age of Clone (SATA) using CoolGear hard-
ware, forensic image of Clone (IDE) using
CoolGear hardware.
The following scenarios were be tested: Ex-
aminer Windows Machine containing FTK
Imager, Belkasoft Capture, Roadkil Disk Im-
age; Windows to Go Flash Drive containing
Magnet Acquire, Tableau Imager, FTK Im-
ager v4.2.1; Caine 11 containing Guymager;
Kali Linux 2020 (forensics mode) containing
Guymager; Kali Linux 2020 (live mode) con-
taing Guymager; Parrot 4.7 (forensics mode)
containing Guymager; Parrot 4.7 (live mode)
containing Guymager; OSFClone 1.2.1000
containing Image Drive options; Deft (UEFI)
containing Guymager; Paladin 7 (read only)
containing Imager; Paladin Edge 64 (read
only) containing Imager; Paladin 7 (read-




Hardware Write Blocker testing under
the NIST’s CFTT Federated TestingTh-
elma.allen@nist.gov (2020) suite shows that
the the CoolGear device does not adequately
protect the writes on disk from Linux in
both the Suspect SSD and Clone Drive con-
nected through SATA (Figure 8 and Figure
9). These results were passed to NIST and
will included in an unpublished future report.
Figure 3. CoolGear Write Block SATA SSD
Linux
Hardware Writer Blocker testing using
CRU’s Write Blocker Validation Utility shows
that the the CoolGear device does not ade-
quately protect the writes on disk from Win-
Figure 4. CoolGear Write Block SATA HDD
Linux
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dows in three instances (Figures 5, 6 and 7)
of testing (two SSDs and one HDD)
Figure 5. CoolGear Write Block SATA SSD
Windows
Figure 6. CoolGear Write Block SATA SSD
Windows
At this point, an image of the original was
made before any of the testing using the three
Figure 7. CoolGear Write Block SATA HDD
Windows
tools (Figures 14, 15 and 16). Pictures of the
setup (Figure 13) and results (Table 9 and
10) as well as an issue found with Diskimage
being unable to capture an image for this.
The first set of problems is encountered
here as Roadkil’s Diskimage is unable to im-
age the drive through the Tableau T3U (Fig-
ure 17). The actual images are different by
24kb so it appears to have stopped near the
end of the capture (Figure 18).
After capturing the images, NIST’s suite
was used to initialize the disks for test-
ing. The first of the consumer grade tests
was performed taking a ’forensic copy’ us-
ing the Cinolink hardware (Figure 21 and
22). After cloning was completed, the NIST
suite validated the clone and results were
passed to NIST’s CFTT Federated Test-
ingThelma.allen@nist.gov (2020) as well as
validating using FTK Imager and Belkasoft
(Figure 23, 24 and 25) and using the hashes
(Table 12 and 13).
At this moment, AccessData revoked the
certificates for FTK Imager Lite and we were
unable to use it for further testing. We retake
© 2021 JDFSL Page 9
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Figure 8. Initial Image Setup
Table 9. Initial Images MD5*
Tool Results
Used MD5
FTK Imager Lite a628bdc22e99cc18edc1aee78865e9db
Belkasoft Capturer a628bdc22e99cc18edc1aee78865e9db*
Roadkill Diskimage Fail To Capture
*Hash Adjusted To Lowercase
Table 10. Initial Images SHA1
Tool Results
Used SHA1
FTK Imager Lite 842d0f27a870da4d6cd32c60674320fd28dc2540
Belkasoft Capturer 842d0f27a870da4d6cd32c60674320fd28dc2540*
Roadkill Diskimage Fail To Capture
*Hash Adjusted To Lowercase
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Figure 9. Initial FTK Image Verification
Figure 10. Initial Belkasoft Capture Image Verification
Figure 11. Roadkil’s Diskimage at 100%
the same images as before of the Suspect
Drive with FTK Imager and Belkasoft.
This test shows that this drive duplicator is
capable of operating without contaminating
data for this specific drive (Table 11).
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Table 11. Suspect Drive Images CinoLink after Cloning
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager Yes Yes
Belkasoft Capturer Yes Yes
Figure 12. Roadkil’s Diskimage Error
After this point, images of the cloned drive
were supposed to be taken but the Tableau
T3U did not recognize the cloned drive (note
the SATA detect light is not detecting the
drive on Figure 26) so images had to be taken
with the Coolgear ’write protect’ hardware
(note both IDE and SATA have been switched
to the ’lock’ providing write blocking capabil-
ity on Figure 27) using the same tools. The
clones were validated using FTK Imager and
Belkasoft (Figure 28 and Figure 29).
At this point, the CoolGear ’write protect’
hardware was supposed to be used to write an
image back to the IDE drive, but it appears
there is a glitch under Windows which does
not allow IDE drives to be written to even if
write protection is disabled. This information
was passed to the manufacturer via support
ticket.
An existing consumer product (ULTRA
USB 2.0 to IDE / SATA adapter) was used
to forensically wipe the drive using Roadkil’s
Diskwipe. After wiping the drive, NIST’s
suite was used to initialize the disks for test-
ing. The second of the consumer grade tests
was performed by writing a ’forensic image’
using Roadkil’s Diskwipe (Figure 30).
After cloning was completed, the NIST
suite validated the clone and results were
passed to NIST’s CFTT Federated Test-
ingThelma.allen@nist.gov (2020) and using
FTK Imager and Belkasoft (Figure 31, 32
and 33). We validated the hashes again (Ta-
ble 14) to ensure there was no spoilage and
the hashes afterwards (Table 16 and 17)
3.2 Imaging Phase
All testing in the Imaging Phase will occur
using the CoolGear ’write protect’ hardware.
All of the initial drives (Suspect, Clone, Clone
IDE) was imaged using the hardware and any
failures were reset using Roadkil’ DiskImage.
Tests for Windows Live Tools were per-
formed using FTK Imager Lite, Belkasoft
Capturer and Roadkil’s DiskImage randomiz-
ing the order in which the tools are run, and
hashing (MD5 and SHA1) was performed on
the output to validate whether the media was
modified (Table 17, 18 and 19). Before begin-
ning the Live Tools testing under Windows,
signtool.exe from the Windows 10 SDK was
used to remove the revoked certificate from
AccessData on FTK Imager Lite (Figure 36).
This will allow for testing to be performed
using FTK Imager Lite until there is a long
term fix for this issue.
Tests for Windows To Go Tools were per-
formed using FTK Imager 4.2.1.4, Magnet
ACQUIRE and Tableau Imager randomizing
the order in which the tools are run (Table 20,
21 and 22). Tableau Imager failed to capture
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Figure 13. Image Size Differences*
Figure 14. Cino Link Setup





*Hash Adjusted To Lowercase
the images as it was not connected using a
Tableau Forensic Bridge Tilbury (2010) (Fig-
ure 30).
After Windows To Go Imaging was com-
pleted, work began on Linux-based imag-
ing solutions to validate the write block-
ing capabilities of the CoolGear Write Pro-
tect.This hardware has issues blocking some
of the writes under the CFTT Testing Suit-
eThelma.allen@nist.gov (2020), so this test-
ing was critical to find any flaws. CAINE
11, Kali Linux 2020 (forensics), Kali Linux
2020 (live), Parrot 4.7 (forensics), Parrot 4.7
(live), BackBox 6 (live) OSFClone 1.2.1000,
© 2021 JDFSL Page 13
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Figure 15. Cino Link 100% Cloned
Figure 16. NIST CinoLink Cloning Results
Figure 17. After Cloning Suspect FTK Imager Image Verification
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Figure 18. After Cloning Suspect Belkasoft Capture Image Verification





*Hash Adjusted To Lowercase
Table 14. Suspect Drive Images After Roadkil’s DiskImage after Cloning
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager Yes Yes
Belkasoft Capturer Yes Yes





*Hash Adjusted To Lowercase
DEFT 8, Padalin Edge and Paladin 7 were
used in these set of tests. Each distribution
was booted using YUMI Multiboot Pendriv-
elinux.com (2020) and used to take the same
images (Suspect, Clone SATA and Clone
IDE) from the test media using the CoolGear
Write Protect hardware and hashing (MD5
and SHA1) was performed on the output to
validate whether the media was modified (Ta-
ble 23, 24 and 25).
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Table 17. Windows Live Imaging - Suspect
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager Lite Yes Yes
Belkasoft Capturer Yes Yes
Roadkil’s DiskImage Fail to Capture Fail to Capture
Table 18. Windows Live Imaging - Clone SATA
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager Lite Yes Yes
Belkasoft Capturer Yes Yes
Roadkil’s DiskImage Fail to Capture Fail to Capture
Table 19. Windows Live Imaging - Clone IDE
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager Lite Yes Yes
Belkasoft Capturer Yes Yes
Roadkil’s DiskImage Fail to Capture Fail to Capture
Differences in mounting policy among
Linux suites should be considered when test-
ing tools. CAINE 11 mounted all volumes
as read only; Kali Linux 2020 and Parrot 4.7
did not mount any volumes (even in live non-
forensics mode); BackBox 6 did not mount
the internal volumes, but mounted the exter-
nal volumes as read / write; OSFClone asked
before mounting volumes for writing (and un-
mounted as soon as writing was completed);
DEFT 8.2 did not mount any volumes; Pal-
adin Edge and Paladin 7 did not mount any
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Table 20. Windows To Go Imaging - Suspect
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager 4.2.1.4 Yes Yes
MAGNET Acquire Yes Yes
Tableau Imager Fail to Capture* Fail to Capture*
Table 21. Windows To Go Imaging - Clone SATA
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager 4.2.1.4 Yes Yes
MAGNET Acquire Yes Yes
Tableau Imager Fail to Capture* Fail to Capture*
Table 22. Windows To Go Imaging - Clone IDE
Tool Results
Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
FTK Imager 4.2.1.4 Yes Yes
MAGNET Acquire Yes Yes
Tableau Imager Fail to Capture* Fail to Capture*
Figure 19. Tableau T3U Not Recognizing
Drive
volumes, did not allow mounting the disks as
Figure 20. CoolGear Configuration
read/write, and does not allow imaging when
volumes are mounted.
The following devices (Nvidia Flash Drive,
Netac SD Card, and WD Blue) had to be
cleaned by diskpart before they could be
’wiped’ by Roadkil’s Diskwipe (Figure 34).
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Figure 21. Clone FTK Image Verification
Figure 22. Clone Belkasoft Capture Image Verification
Figure 23. Clone IDE HDD Written
After completing the testing for imaging,
testing was performed for Forensic Wiping
using Roadkil’s Diskwipe and NIST’s CFTT
Federated Testing Thelma.allen@nist.gov
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Figure 24. NIST Roadkil’s DiskImage Cloning Results
Figure 25. After Validating IDE Suspect FTK Imager Image Verification
Figure 26. After Validating IDE Suspect Belkasoft Capture Image Verification
(2020) suite. Results were passed to NIST
for future publications (Figure 35, Figure 36,
and Table 26).
4. CONCLUSION
The consumer grade software tested (Road-
kil’s DiskWipe and Roadkil’s DiskImage)
were able to pass some of the NIST suite
of tests in a variety of scenarios. Road-
kil’s DiskWipe was not able to fully wipe
any of the target disksof Homeland Security
(DHS) Science & (ST) (2020c) while Road-
kil’s DiskImage was able to write an image
back to a disk successfully although it had
some issues acquiring images from disksof
Homeland Security (DHS) Science & (ST)
(2020b).
The consumer grade hardware tested
(Cinolink Dual HDD Dock and CoolGear
Write Protect) were able to pass some of
the NIST suite of tests. Cinolink Dual HDD
Dock was able to perform a forensic clone
of multiple SATA disks without contaminat-
ing the original deviceof Homeland Security
(DHS) Science & (ST) (2020a) while the Cool-
Gear Write Protect had issues maintaining
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Figure 27. Clone IDE FTK Image Verification
Figure 28. Clone IDE Belkasoft Capture Image Verification
Figure 29. Signtool.exe
Figure 30. Tableau Imager Fail to Image
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Figure 31. Paladin Edge Read Only
Figure 32. Paladin Edge No Mounting While Imaging
Table 23. Linux-based Imaging - Suspect
OS Tool Results
Used Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
CAINE 11 Guymager Yes Yes
Kali Linux 2020 (forensics) Guymager Yes Yes
Kali Linux 2020 (live) Guymager Yes Yes
Parrot 4.7 (forensics) Guymager Yes Yes
Parrot 4.7 (live) Guymager Yes Yes
BackBox 6 Guymager Yes Yes
OSFClone 1.2.1000 Image Yes* Yes*
DEFT 8.2 Guymager Yes Yes
Paladin Edge (read) Imager Yes Yes
Paladin Edge (read/write) Imager Not Allowed Not Allowed
Paladin 7 (read) Imager Yes Yes
Paladin 7 (read/write) Imager Not Allowed Not Allowed
*Hash Manually Computed
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Table 24. Linux-based Imaging - Clone SATA
OS Tool Results
Used Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
CAINE 11 Guymager Yes Yes
Kali Linux 2020 (forensics) Guymager Yes Yes
Kali Linux 2020 (live) Guymager Yes Yes
Parrot 4.7 (forensics) Guymager Yes Yes
Parrot 4.7 (live) Guymager Yes Yes
BackBox 6 Guymager Yes Yes
OSFClone 1.2.1000 Image Yes* Yes*
DEFT 8.2 Guymager Yes Yes
Paladin Edge (read) Imager Yes Yes
Paladin Edge (read/write) Imager Not Allowed Not Allowed
Paladin 7 (read) Imager Yes Yes
Paladin 7 (read/write) Imager Not Allowed Not Allowed
*Hash Manually Computed
Table 25. Linux-based Imaging - Clone IDE
OS Tool Results
Used Used MD5 Match SHA1 Match
CAINE 11 Guymager Yes Yes
Kali Linux 2020 (forensics) Guymager Yes Yes
Kali Linux 2020 (live) Guymager Yes Yes
Parrot 4.7 (forensics) Guymager Yes Yes
Parrot 4.7 (live) Guymager Yes Yes
BackBox 6 Guymager Yes Yes
OSFClone 1.2.1000 Image Yes* Yes*
DEFT 8.2 Guymager Yes Yes
Paladin Edge (read) Imager Yes Yes
Paladin Edge (read/write) Imager Not Allowed Not Allowed
Paladin 7 (read) Imager Yes Yes
Paladin 7 (read/write) Imager Not Allowed Not Allowed
write protection under Windows and Linux
environments. Additional testing of the Cool-
Gear Write Protect shows that most common
imaging software under Windows and Linux
suites can be used successfully without con-
taminating devices being write blocked.
Consumer grade software and hardware
offers great value for budget conscious or-
ganizations wanting to improve the overall
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Figure 33. Failed To Wipe
Table 26. Forensic Wipe Testing
Device Device Results
Used Capacity Device Type Outcome
Nvidia Flash Drive 64Gb Flash Drive Fail
Netac SD Card 8Gb SD Card Fail
Inland Professional 120Gb 2.5" SSD Fail
WD Green 120Gb 2.5" SSD Fail
Maxtor Diamond 10 160Gb 3.5" HDD Fail
Corsair Force 200gb 2.5" SSD Fail
Seagate Momentus 300Gb 3.5" HDD Fail
Toshiba MQ01ABD100 1Tb 2.5" HDD Fail
WD Blue 1Tb 3.5" HDD Fail
technical proficiency of students. This testing
shows that the customer grade hardware has
forensics value on a budget but is not guar-
anteed to be usable in a legal setting. Orga-
nizations wanting to teach fundamentals can
utilize consumer grade hardware for teaching
fundamentals and are always advised to vali-
date their hardware using scientific methods
and tools as outlined. Utilizing a mixture of
open source software and hardware allows for
the hardware to produce reproducible results
that can be relied upon and shows that there
are potential uses of some of this consumer
grade hardware and software as long as the
limitations that exist within the hardware
and software are understood and accounted
for.
5. FUTURE WORK
Future work can focus on validating the foren-
sic validity of free / open source USB write
blockers such as Ratool Sordum.org (2015),
Thumbscrew IronGeek (2013), and USB
WriteProtector Gaigin.net (2011) against
other software based USB write blockers
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Figure 34. Cleaning with diskpart
Figure 35. Successful Wipe
such as SAFE Block ForensicSoft (2008) and
ACES WriteBlocker for Law Enforcement
(2008) as well as other hardware-based USB
write blockers from CRU CRU (2020) or
Tableau Tableau (2020).
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Figure 36. Forensic Wipe Results
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Figure 37. Case B451C Contents
Figure 38. Contents of Suspect’s Screen
Figure 39. Open Application on Suspect’s
Computer - Proton Mail Bridge
Figure 40. Open Application on Suspect’s
Computer - Mail App
Figure 41. Flash Drive with tools connected
to Suspect’s Computer
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Figure 42. Evidence Drive connected to Sus-
pect’s Computer
Figure 43. Process Explorer Dump
Figure 44. OpenedFileView
Figure 45. MAGNET RAM Capture
Figure 46. Belkasoft RAM Capturer
Figure 47. DumpIt
Figure 48. MAGNET’s Encrypted Disk De-
tector
Figure 49. CredentialsFileView
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Figure 53. Suspect’s Drive inside Suspect’s
Computer
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